

# Control Systems Security Program - Transportation

DHS CSSP

ICSJWG Conference – Seattle

October 27, 2010

David Sawin



# Cyber Security is a National Issue



Howard Schmidt  
White House Cyber Security Coordinator

- Howard Schmidt appointed White House Cyber Security Coordinator, Dec. 2009
- 2010 Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset
- PDD63 – Critical Infrastructure

# 18 Critical Infrastructure Sectors

*Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) along with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) identified & categorized U.S. Critical Infrastructure into the following 18 Critical Infrastructure & Key Resources Sectors*

1. Agriculture & Food
2. Banking & Finance
3. Chemical
4. Commercial Facilities
5. Dams
6. Defense Industrial Base
7. Emergency Services
8. Energy
9. Government Facilities
10. Information Technology
11. National Monuments & Icons
12. Nuclear Reactors, Materials, & Waste
13. Postal & Shipping
14. Public Health & Healthcare
15. Telecommunications
- 16. Transportation**
17. Water
18. Critical Manufacturing\*





# The John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center



# U.S. DOT strategic goals

- Safety/Security
- State of good repair
- Economic competitiveness
- Livable communities
- Environmental sustainability



Photo courtesy of the Volpe Center



# Volpe Center mission, vision and capabilities

## Mission and vision

- A world-recognized Federal center of excellence and leader in transportation
- Trusted enabler of critical improvements to transportation and logistics systems
- Leader in government, industry, and academic cooperation

## Unique capabilities

- Institutional knowledge of the global transportation systems
- Awareness of Federal responsibilities, objectives, and activities in the public interest
- Experience with the full spectrum of technologies and disciplines relevant to transportation system improvements



# Centers of Innovation at the Volpe Center

- Multimodal Systems Research and Analysis
- Safety Management Systems
- Environmental and Energy Systems
- **Freight Logistics and Transportation Systems**
- Physical Infrastructure Systems
- Communication, Navigation, Surveillance and Traffic Management Systems
- Human Factors Research and System Applications
- Advanced Vehicle and Information Network Systems



# Volpe Center Cyber Security Life Cycle Support



# Volpe Center Cyber Security Life Cycle Support

## FAA

- National Airspace System (NAS) Vulnerability Assessment for PDD-63
- ~ 50 C&A's and Penetration Testing for the National Airspace System
- GPS Vulnerability Assessment
- Cyber Security Awareness Training & Workshops
- Cyber Security Incident Response Center (CSIRC)
- Airborne Network IA Support (Security/Safety R&D studies, RTCA SC-216)
- B-787 Security Certification and Cyber Training Support
- Aerospace Network Security Simulator
- WebCM – C&A, Operational Support, Configuration Management Tools



# Volpe Center Cyber Security Life Cycle Support

## USAF/TSWG

- Joint USAF/Civil AN R&D Plans for Secure Airborne Networks
- AN Workshops (US and UK)
- Electronic Flight Bag Security Use Case/Risk Assessment
- Commercial Derivative Aircraft Cyber Papers

## OTHER


- NASA – Airborne Network IA Research Studies
- TSA – Transportation Worker Identification Card C&A
- Maryland Intelligent Transportation System Cyber Security Assessment
- DOT Intelligent Transportation System JPO - Trust Model for *Intellidrive*

# Volpe Center Supporting DHS Control System Security Program in Transportation



- Control system inventory
- Threat and vulnerability assessments
- Research and simulation laboratory
- National Cyber Incident Response Plan
- Real-time reporting concepts
- Outreach, training and professional capacity building
- Transportation Control System Security Roadmap
- International Collaboration

# Planned Engagement of Modes



All Transportation Modes - ■

Rail & Aviation - ■

Highway, Pipeline, Maritime, Non-rail Transit & Intermodal - ■




# Volpe Center Supporting DHS Control System Security Program in Transportation


- Major players
  - DHS CSSP Joint Working Group, conferences & workshops
  - DHS TSA Joint Working Group
  - American Public Transportation Association, Amtrak, Association of American Railroads, Union Pacific, FTA, FRA
  - Surface Transportation/Public Transportation ISACS,
  - FAA, Highway, Pipeline, Maritime
  - Many others



# Transportation Systems Are Becoming Increasingly Dependent on Information Technology



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Photo number 7201240 should be purchased for each project in which this image is used.





# 14 Year Old Boy Derails Polish Trams with Modified TV Remote



Source: Telegraph.co.uk, 11 January 2008

# Future Positive Train Control Systems



# Intelligent Transportation System Vulnerabilities: Variable Message Signs on Highways Hacked



**[HACKED PROGRAMMABLE ROAD SIGN]**  
Hitman by Anonymous (2007)  
Tuesday, 20 January 2009  
How many times have you driven by an electronic road sign like one of these?  
This is the ADOCO portable sign. Today, you see what is on the inside, and how they are programmed to display important information.  
\*\*\* WARNING YOU SHOULD NEVER TAMPER WITH THESE SIGNS \*\*\*

1. The access panel on the sign is generally protected by a small lock, but often are left unprotected. Upon opening the access panel you can see the display electronics.




2. The black control pad is attached by a curly cord, with a LieBoard on the face.



3. Programming is as simple as scrolling down the menu selection to "Instant Text". Type whatever you want to display, Hit Enter to submit. You can now either throw it up on the sign by selecting "Run w/out save" or you can add more pages to it by selecting "Add page".

\*\* HACKER TIPS \*\* Should it ask you for a password. Try "DOTS", the default password.  
In all likelihood, the crew will not have changed it. However if they did, never fear. Hold "Control" and "Shift" and while holding, enter "DEPY". This will reset the sign and reset the password to "DOTS" in the process. You're in!



Hacking instructions were available on [i-hacked.com](http://i-hacked.com).


# Traffic Management System Vulnerabilities



Traffic signal computer crash & power failure in Maryland delays thousands.

Source: Washington Post, November 5, 2009

Disgruntled employee hacked into traffic control computer in Los Angeles; shut down signals at key points causing delays for four days in 2006.



Traffic management centers vulnerable to malware and hacking

# Cyber-physical Systems in Automobiles Vulnerable




Key vehicle systems controlled by hacker teams from U. of Washington and UCSD



Tire sensor hacking kit developed by University of South Carolina and Rutgers U.

Source: MIT Technology Review, August 10, 2010


# Future Intelligent Transportation System: Intellidrive



# Today's Air Traffic Control System




# NextGen Air Traffic Control System



“NextGen: Security = Safety”

# Coordinated Collaboration Among All Stakeholders

## Airborne Network Cyber Security Issues



- Designers & manufacturers
- Equipment suppliers
- System integrators
- University & government researchers
- Testing organizations
- Users
- Infrastructure operators
- Standards organizations
- Regulators

Example: Airborne Network Security

# Today's Automated Maritime Systems

- Today's maritime environment includes automation throughout our nation's ports
  - Automated entry systems
  - Wireless cargo tracking
  - Driverless cranes and other vehicles



# Driverless Vehicle

- Hamburg Germany. Driverless vehicle moving 40' container to automated storage crane.



# Crane Accident

- Oakland, CA. Dropped cargo container too early. Is this a result of a Control System failure?



# Vessel Balance Accident

- Liberia. Vessel storage usually executed by Control System “Bay Plan”. Several onboard ship systems are Control Systems




# Hazardous Cargo

- Guam. Water activated cargo. Not all hazardous cargo is coded correctly resulting in inaccurate manifest



# Navigation Malfunction

- Oakland, CA. Steering or navigation malfunction.



# Dry-dock Malfunction

- Dubai. Opened sea gate while workers were under vessel resulting in 27 deaths and the loss of 2 vessels.



# Pipeline Explosions



# Next Steps = Collaboration

- We would like to communicate and learn from all of you
  - What's been done?
  - What are the...
    - Lessons learned and Methodologies
- For Transportation
  - Control system inventory
  - Threat, vulnerability and assessments
  - Research and simulation laboratory
  - National Cyber Incident Response Plan
  - Real-time reporting concept
  - Outreach, Training and Professional Capacity Building
  - Transportation Roadmap
  - International Collaboration



# Contact Information

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